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JUDGMENT FOR JUDGES:
WHAT TRADITIONAL STATISTICS DON’T
TELL YOU ABOUT CAUSAL CLAIMS
Steven N. Goodman, M.D.∗
INTRODUCTION
The determination of the likelihood that a given agent or
exposure caused an injury to another person is a critical
foundation of the tort system. When this determination is based
on evidence derived from statistical analyses of scientific
studies, it is critical that a judge or jury reviewing these analyses
or the testimony of experts understand where statistics leave off
and judgment begins. Too often, the determination of causality
in the tort setting is left to a formulaic misapplication of what
are regarded as scientific criteria for proof. This essay will
review how scientific and legal judgment must augment
statistical measures in addressing questions of both general and
specific causation. This article will explore the traditional
method of statistical inference, based on hypothesis testing and
P-values, then an alternative based on Bayes Theorem, with the
Bayes Factor as a measure of evidence.
I. TRADITIONAL STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE APPROACH VS.
BAYES THEOREM
First, this article will explore in some depth the meaning of
a finding of “statistical significance,” which is the cornerstone
∗
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of virtually all claims of scientific proof. It will show that
standard statistical indices do not answer the question most
judges are interested in, for example, how likely an observed
relationship reflects a true one. It will set aside for the moment
the question of whether that relationship, once established, is
causal. If no relationship is found, then the causal question is
moot. So it is reasonable first to examine the question of
whether an observed statistical relationship is due to chance, or
an alternative, non-chance explanation.
A simple example will serve as the departure point for this
exploration. Let us imagine that a plaintiff claims that proximity
to a local power plant is responsible for an increased leukemia
risk in a town, and the court is interested in the truth of that
claim. An epidemiologic study addressing this question is
designed and conducted.1 Traditional statistical methods
approach the process of inference as follows:
1. State a null hypothesis (Ho): There is no effect of
the proximity to plant on leukemia risk.
2. Calculate the rarity of the observed geographic
pattern of leukemia cases under that null
hypothesis: The measure of “rarity” is measured by
an index called a “P-value.”2 The P-values for the
pattern is reported as equal to 0.03.
3. If observed data are “rare enough” under the
null hypothesis then “statistical significance” is
declared. Statistical significance is typically defined
as a P-value less than 5 percent. As the reported Pvalue of 3 percent here is less than this, one “rejects
the null hypothesis” and declares that the association
between leukemia risk and power plant proximity
has been scientifically demonstrated.
On the surface, the above procedure seems appealingly
1

One aspect of this process which will not be discussed here is how the
study design or statistical analysis eliminates variables other than distance
from the plant as determinants of outcome, factors known as “confounders,”
and whose control is critical to causal inference.
2
See infra Part II.A. for further discussion.
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logical and “scientific” (i.e., objective). However, the question
might arise, where is there room for judgment? The short
answer is that, in a formal sense, there is none. Judgment makes
its appearance only when we recognize that the procedure above
does not, in fact, address the question posed earlier: “What is
the probability that chance is the explanation for the observed
pattern of illness around the plant?” The procedure described
above is a decision rule, not directly addressing the question we
need answered.3 We will see this as we closely examine the
logic of standard statistical procedures, starting with the meaning
of the central statistical index, the P-value.
A. The P-value
Introduced as an inferential tool by R.A. Fisher in the
1920s, the P-value is the central evidential index that undergirds
the calculations of traditional, “frequentist” statistics.4 Its
definition is as follows:
Under the hypothesis of no effect, the P-value is the
probability of observing a result equal to or more
extreme than the observed data (relative to the null
hypothesis).
This can be written as follows (where Prob=probability):
Prob (Future observed effect ≥ Current observed
effect, given that the True effect = 0)
A graphical counterpart to this equation can be found in
Figure 1. The “Future” effect refers to an effect that might be
observed if we exactly repeated the study under the identical
conditions. When examining this definition carefully, it does not
have a clear common sense interpretation. To underscore this,
let us consider the guidance offered in a textbook titled Intuitive
3

See generally Steven N. Goodman & Richard Royall, Commentary,
Evidence and Scientific Research, 78 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1568 (1988); See
also RICHARD ROYALL, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE: A LIKELIHOOD PARADIGM 133 (Chapman & Hall 1997).
4
See RONALD A. FISHER, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH
WORKERS 24-76 (13th ed. 1958).
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Biostatistics. “Thinking about P-values seems quite
counterintuitive at first, as you must use backwards, awkward
logic. Unless you are a lawyer or a Talmudic scholar . . . you
will probably find this sort of reasoning a bit uncomfortable.”5
The “backwards” logic of the P-value is related to the fact
that it is a deductive probability statement. It assigns a
probability to the data under the assumption that we know the
null hypothesis to be true. But the question at hand requires an
inductive statement, a statement about the probability of a
hypothesis based on the evidence, the reverse or “backwards”
direction. The difference is equivalent to the contrast between
the probability of the evidence, assuming a defendant were
innocent (deductive), and the probability of innocence given the
evidence (inductive). The route from the P-value to a probability
of a given claim being right or wrong is circuitous, and not part
of conventional statistical approaches.
To see this, let us contrast the P-value with the mathematical
counterpart of the question posed earlier: given the observed
effect, what is the chance that the true effect is zero (or
conversely, non-zero)? This can be written as follows:
Probability of a claim: Prob (True effect = 0 given the
Observed effect)
This probability cannot be calculated with standard statistical
methods. However, there is an inductive inferential calculus,
known as Bayes Theorem, about which much has been written
in application to the law.6 Figure 2 shows Bayes Theorem, first
written using the legal analogy and then its statistical
counterpart, where the hypothesis of “innocence” is instead the
hypothesis of “no effect.”
5

HARVEY MOTULSKY, INTUITIVE BIOSTATISTICS 96 (Oxford Univ. Press
1995).
6
See Stephen E. Fienberg & Joseph B. Kadane, The Presentation of
Bayesian Statistical Analyses in Legal Proceedings, 32 STATISTICIAN 88
(1983); Donald A. Berry, Inferences Using DNA Profiling in Forensic
Identification, 6 STAT. SCI. 175 (1991); Donald A. Berry & Seymour
Geisser, Inference in Cases of Disputed Paternity, in STATISTICS AND THE
LAW 353-82 (Morris H. DeGroot, Stephen E. Fienberg & Joseph B. Kadane
eds., John Wiley & Sons 1986).
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B. Bayes Theorem
Bayes Theorem is a fascinating mathematical and philosophic
entity. The mathematics of the theorem are simple and
incontrovertible, but its implications profound. If we are dealing
with modeling games of chance, or medical diagnoses or other
situations where all the relevant probabilities are well described,
there is no question as to its relevance and correctness. Where
its application becomes trickier, and more controversial, is in
the realms of inference highlighted here: statistical and legal.
The controversy stems from its requirement for a “prior
probability” of a hypothesis. In the legal realm this hypothesis
could be one of innocence, and in the scientific arena a
hypothesis of no effect. Thus, how to assign and then interpret
probabilities on these hypotheses is controversial. It will not be
the application of Bayes Theorem that we will focus on here, but
rather how it illustrates the flaws in logic—and room for
judgment—in the standard approaches to statistical proof.
It is worth first contrasting to the Bayesian measure of
evidence—the Bayes Factor—with the P-values. The Bayes
factor is simply a comparison of how likely the evidence is
under two competing hypotheses. It is different from the Pvalues in two critical ways. First, it is comparative. Evidence
that is rare under the null hypothesis is not considered evidence
against it unless that same evidence can be shown to be more
common under the competing hypothesis. In contrast, the
competing or “alternative” hypothesis has no role in calculating
the P-values. Second, because the Bayes Factor is comparative,
it can be negative or positive, i.e. support either hypothesis
relative to the other. In contrast, the P-values is only negative,
i.e., against the null hypothesis, making it impossible to quantify
evidence that supports the hypothesis of no effect (or of
innocence).7 Both of these features are captured in colorful
quotations from a noted epidemiologist from the 1940’s:
7

See Goodman and Royall, supra note 3, at 1569 (citing Jerome
Cornfield, Sequential Trials, Sequential Analysis, and the Likelihood
Principle, 20 AM. STATIST. 18 (1996)); ROYALL, supra note 3, at 68-71.
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[T]he argument does not seem to accord with what
would be the mode of reasoning in ordinary rational
discourse . . . . Suppose I said, “Albinos are very
rare in human populations . . . . Therefore, if you
have taken a random sample of 100 . . . and found in
it an albino, the population is not human.” . . . I
believe the rational retort would be, “If the
population is not human, what is it?” . . . With the
corpus delicti in front of you, you do not say, “Here
is evidence against the hypothesis that no one is
dead.” You say, “Evidently someone has been
murdered.”8
In comparing standard methods to Bayesian approaches to
inference, it first must be noted that they are asking different
questions and have different aims. It is in understanding these
different aims that we will see why judgment seems to play a
role in one but not the other. The aim of the Bayesian inference
is to calculate the probability that a knowledge claim or
hypothesis is true or false. It does this, however, at a price—a
price that requires specification of the probability of that same
relationship in the absence of the current empirical evidence. In
many instances, that prior probability will be unavoidably
subjective, and differ among experts, leading to this inferential
approach being tarred as “subjective” or “nonscientific.”
The central question that arises is, what would an inferential
system look like that avoided the seeming subjectivity of Bayes
Theorem? This was exactly the conundrum faced by R.A. Fisher
in the 1920s and Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson in the 1930s,
which leads them to develop a new “frequentist” statistical
approach to this question, the model of which was presented
earlier.9
“Frequentist” is a term referring to a definition of
probability that requires a well defined, mathematically
8

Joseph Berkson, Tests of Significance Considered as Evidence, 37 J.
AM. STAT. ASS’N 325, 326 (1942) (emphasis in original).
9
See supra Part II.A. and infra note 11 for a further discussion and
explanation.
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justifiable, empirically observable foundation for the calculation
of the probability. The definition, most powerfully articulated by
Richard von Mises in the late 1920s, defines probability as the
relative frequency of objects with a particular trait amidst a large
collective of otherwise indistinguishable objects, such as the
fraction of all 60-year olds over 6 feet tall.10 In theory, any
scientist observing the same collective would measure the same
relative frequency. This definition represented an effort to put
probability on scientific par with other fundamental measures of
nature, like mass, velocity and length.
Thus, a system of inference based on frequentist probability
would have to be based on probabilities that were indisputable,
i.e., governed by clearly defined probability distributions, such
that any scientist armed with the same distribution would
calculate the same number. That is a characteristic of deductive
probabilities: if you accept the premises, you accept the
subsequent calculations. The notion of a probability of a
hypothesis is anathema; such a number is not deemed a
probability at all, since there can be no “long run” or
“collective” of hypotheses. So the frequentist abandons, at the
outset, any notion that they will be assessing the credibility of a
truth claim. Instead, the frequentist is concerned with long-run
probabilities, i.e., probabilities of possible outcomes, defined
against a theoretical infinite number of repetitions of an
experiment.
The question then becomes, if the frequentist declines to
calculate the probability of truth, what is the goal of the system
of traditional statistics? The answer is, to control the number of
errors over the long run, but not calculate the chance of error in
any particular case. This was articulated clearly and forcefully
by Neyman and Pearson in their classic paper:
[N]o test based upon the theory of probability can by
itself provide any valuable evidence of the truth or
falsehood of that hypothesis.
But we may look at the purpose of tests from another
10

RICHARD VON MISES, PROBABILITY, STATISTICS AND TRUTH 11-29
(Dover Publ. ed., George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 2d ed. 1957).
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view-point. Without hoping to know whether each
separate hypothesis is true or false, we may search
for rules to govern our behaviour with regard to
them, in following which we insure that, in the long
run of experience, we shall not be too often wrong.11
It is the opening of the above passage that is critical to
understand. The “theory of probability” referred to here is the
frequentist definition. Thus, the standard statistical method of
“hypothesis testing” is roughly akin to a judicial system where
the goal is to minimize the collective number of incorrect
verdicts, without regard to whether each individual is guilty or
innocent. The problem encountered with this is analogous with
the practice of “profiling” by police; it may indeed identify a
class of individuals at a higher risk for some behavior, but to
blindly apply a group characteristic to each member of that
group is recognized as unjust. A practice that might work “on
average” can be profoundly and recognizably wrong in
particular cases.
The Bayesian definition of probability, in contrast, concerns
itself precisely with what is eschewed above; the degree of
belief that a specific hypothesis is true or false. Bayes Theorem,
as defined earlier, tells us how this can be calculated. It tells us
that the purpose of evidence, whether scientific or legal, is to
change the probability that a given hypothesis is true. It tells us
that if a hypothesis is more or less likely before seeing the
evidence, it is correspondingly more or less likely afterwards; its
prior plausibility affects its plausibility after considering the new
evidence.
In both the legal and scientific settings, this requires a close
look at the details of a particular case, instead of applying
similar rules to all cases. In the legal realm, in a case based on
circumstantial evidence, a key requirement affecting prior
probability could be a motive for the crime. In the absence of
such a motive, the prior probability might be so low that only
11

Jerzy Neyman & Egon S. Pearson, On the Problem of the Most
Efficient Tests of Statistical Hypotheses, 231 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL
SOC’Y 289, 291 (Series A. 1933).
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extraordinary circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to
convict.
In science the same degree of evidence can result in a
different conclusion if the prior probability is different. The
prior probability requires a close examination of many of the
factors mentioned above, such as the biologic plausibility of the
relationship, and the strength of prior empirical evidence. The
reliability of that evidence is determined partly through the
strength of the design and conduct of the experiments that
produced it. The strength of an experiment typically is not
describable with numbers. One must rely on expert judgment to
help assess it. Various scientific groups have come up with
crude aids to facilitate such assessment, such as the hierarchy of
evidence used by the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force.12
In addition to the notion of prior probability, another
component missing from standard approaches is a formal notion
of statistical “evidence,” the only language is that of procedural
error rates.13 In contrast, the Bayes Factor is a measure of
evidence with appealing conceptual simplicity. It allows us to
make the connection between traditional P-values and posterior
probabilities. Table 2 shows a Bayesian-frequentist “Rosetta
Stone,” in that it demonstrates the maximum effect that a result
with a given P-value could have on the prior probability of a
hypothesis when viewed through a Bayesian lens.14 Even though
these results represent maximum effects, they are far lower than
many judges, and even scientists, are aware of. For example, a
P-value of 0.03 raises the probability of a 50:50 hypothesis to at
most 91 percent, i.e., there is still almost a one-in-ten chance
that it is wrong. If a hypothesis is implausible or initially
unlikely, less than 25 percent probable, the table tells us that a
P-value of 0.03 cannot raise the probability of such a hypothesis
12

See infra, Table 1 for an illustration of the hierarchy of evidence.
See Goodman, supra note 3, at 1569-70; Steven N. Goodman,
Towards Evidence-Based Medical Statistics, 1: The P-Value Fallacy, 130
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 995 (1999); Steven N. Goodman, Towards
Evidence-Based Medical Statistics 2: The Bayes Factor, 130 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 1005 (1999).
14
See infra, Table 2.
13
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to being more than 78 percent probable, i.e., a 22 percent
chance of being wrong. Even if the P-value is 0.01, a hypothesis
starting with 25 percent probability still has a 10 percent or
greater chance of being false.
This table shows us both that (a) the prior probability is a
critical factor in determining the probability that an observed
relationship is true, given the evidence, and (b) that the
evidential force of P-value is lower than their actual value
suggests, and has little relationship to the probability of the truth
of the null hypothesis.15 Finally, this table only applies to
“ideal” experiments, i.e., those with the strength of a
randomized clinical trial. If these P-values are derived from
observational studies, which are the typical designs used in toxic
tort cases, the effect of the statistical evidence is weaker.
II. JUDGMENT AND SPECIFIC CAUSATION
Specific causation is another domain in which mechanistic
rules have seemingly eliminated the need for judgment. It is
commonly known that for an exposed individual, a condition
passes the “more likely than not” criteria for specific causation
if the relative risk exceeds 2 (or RR>2). The thinking behind
this is based on a very simplistic model of causation. If the
exposure doubles the baseline risk of contracting a condition,
and an exposed person has the condition, then half of his or her
risk is thought to be due to the baseline risk with an equal
degree of additional risk due to the exposure. This additional
risk is called the “attributable risk” in the exposed individual.
Hence, at relative risks higher than 2, this attributable risk will
be larger than the baseline risk, and the individual is regarded as
“more likely than not” to have incurred the condition from his
or her exposure.
Several epidemiologists have written eloquently on the flaw
in this logic, which is easily demonstrated if one introduces a
time dimension into the disease process.16 Consider a process
15
16

See generally infra, Table 2.
See James M. Robins, Should Compensation Schemes be Based on the
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that advances the appearance of disease by a decade. Everyone
exposed who has developed the condition has lost 10 years of
disease-free life, but there are no “excess cases” of the disease,
since no one develops the disease who would not have
otherwise. In such a situation, the relative risk is 1.0, but the
exposure has had an adverse health impact in 100 percent of
exposed individuals with the condition.
Figure 4 shows us that the probability that the exposure
played an important role in the disease’s occurrence cannot be
discerned from the data without some knowledge about the
mechanism by which the disease is produced.17 The upper panel
of the figure shows the situation described above, in that each
individual has had the time of their illness advanced by 10
years.18
Thus, in an epidemiologic study, we would find exposed
individuals with the disease between the ages of 40 to 80,
whereas individuals not exposed to the disease are found to be
between the ages of 50 to 90. We would not be able to tell from
such data whether the exposure advanced the disease’s
appearance by a decade for each person, or whether the person
who would have developed their disease at age 80 instead
developed it at age 40, leaving everyone else unaffected. In both
cases, there is a collective loss of four decades of disease-free
life. But without knowledge of how the disease mechanism
works, we cannot know how it is distributed among the
individuals. So the fraction of individuals affected by the
exposure—sometimes called the “probability of causation”—in
this case varies from 20 percent to 100 percent.19 Only if we
had some measurable biomarker that told us the etiology of the
Probability of Causation or Expected Years of Life Lost?, 12 J. L. & POL’Y
537 (2004); Sander Greenland & James M. Robins, Epidemiology, Justice
and the Probability of Causation, 40 JURIMETRICS 321 (2000); Sander
Greenland, Relation of Probability of Causation to Relative Risk and
Doubling Dose: A Methodologic Error That Has Become a Social Problem,
89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1166 (1999).
17
See infra, Figure 4.
18
Id.
19
See Robins, supra note 16, at 537-48.
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disease in a particular person could we discern empirically
which of these processes were operating.
This example also illustrates another problem with using the
relative risk when time is a factor, as it almost always is. Let us
assume that the individuals in question were exposed on the job,
and that they were all 30 years old at the time. Let us imagine
that an epidemiologic study is immediately mounted, and the
individuals are followed forward in time, along with a
similar-sized cohort of colleagues at work who were not
exposed. After 20 years of follow-up, 2 cases have developed in
the exposed group, and 1 in the unexposed, for a relative risk of
2. After 30 years, the corresponding numbers are 3 and 2, for a
relative risk of 1.5. After 40 years, the relative risk is 4 over 3,
after 50, 4 over 5, and finally, after 60 years, the relative risk is
5 over 5, or 1.0, since 5 subjects in both groups have developed
the disease.
We could change the numbers here so they are as high as we
wish at the beginning. The point is that the relative risk is not a
constant number, and will vary according to how much time the
subjects are observed. It will typically be highest with short
follow-ups, and decrease over time. This is another reason why
relative risk is a poor reflection of the likelihood that an illness
observed in an exposed person is due to that exposure. In
general, the relative risk serves as a lower bound on the fraction
of cases induced by the exposure, but the upper bound is always
100 percent.
CONCLUSION
Simple rules governing either statistical or causal inference
are invariably misleading or outright wrong. Scientific experts
or legal arguments that invoke such rules are making implicit
assumptions, which may not be defensible. Judges must be
aware that the probability of the truth of causal claims is not
calculable from the data alone, and any claim to the contrary is
made out of ignorance or an intent to deceive. While judges
cannot be expected to become methodologic experts themselves,
they can play a critical role in eliciting the foundations for
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judgments that are implicit in any causal claim. These
foundations include:
For general causation:
1. The prior plausibility of the hypothesis being
considered derived from prior studies, known
biology and from mechanistic reasoning.
2. The strength of the design and conduct of the
experiments in the evidence base.
3. The internal coherence of the evidence base with
a proposed or known biologic mechanism.
For specific causation:
1. How well established is the biologic mechanism
for effect.
2. Whether there is any biologic marker that allows
inference about disease etiology in a specific case.
3. If the RR>2 criterion is being used, whether the
disease is an all-or-none phenomenon within the
time period of observation (e.g., symptoms of
food poisoning shortly after a group event), or if
it emerges over an extended time with the timing
and fact of occurrence both being relevant. If the
latter scenario is true, the RR>2 criterion is
invalid.
The principles above apply with particular force to the toxic
torts arena where one quite frequently encounters weak designs
and poorly understood biologic processes, which translate into
low prior probabilities and weak evidence. While rigorous
thinking, formal analysis and systematic approaches to synthesis
are hallmarks of the scientific approach, both scientific and legal
judgment play prominent roles in ascertaining whether a claim
of injury due to toxic exposure is likely to be true, and the
nature of judgments being applied by the experts must be
understood by the presiding judge.
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Table 1: Hierarchy of Clinical Research Designs as Per the US
Preventive Services Task Force
Critical research designs at the top of the table generally
produce evidence of higher reliability or “strength” than those
below.20
EVIDENCE
GRADE

DESIGN

I

Evidence from at least one properly
randomized controlled trial

II-1

Evidence from at least one well-designed,
non-randomized controlled trial

II-2

Evidence from well-designed cohort or
case-controlled studies, preferably from
more than one center or research group

II-3

Evidence from multiple time series with or
without the intervention

III

Opinions of respected authorities based on
clinical experience, descriptive studies and
case reports or reports of expert committees

20

Adapted from Russell P. Harris et al., Current Methods of the US
Preventive Services Task Force: A Review of the Process, 20 AM. J.
PREVENTIVE MED. 21 (2001).
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Table 2: A Frequentist-Bayesian Translation Table
Column 3 gives starting (or “prior”) probabilities of non-null
hypotheses, and Column 4 shows the maximum degree to which
a given P-value can move a non-null hypothesis from a given
starting probability to a final probability.
Increase in Probability of Ha
P-value

Strength of
Evidence

0.10

Weak

0.05

Moderate
to Weak

0.03

Moderate

0.01

Moderate to
Strong

0.001

Strong to
Very Strong

From (%)

To at Most (%)

25
50
83
25
50
74
25
50
67
25
50
40
25
50
9

56
79
95
69
87
95
78
91
95
90
96
95
98.5
99.5
95
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Figure 1: Graphical Representation of the P-value

The curve shows the probability of each possible outcome under
the null hypothesis of no effect. The P-value is the probability of
the observed outcome plus all more extreme outcomes upon
exact repetitions of an experiment.
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Figure 2: Bayes Theorem
The vertical line in the Bayes Factor equation should be read as
“given that” or “if.”
a.)"Legal" Version of Bayes Theorem
Odds of innocence
⎛ Odds of innocence ⎞ ⎛ Prob(Evidence | Innocent) ⎞
=⎜
⎟
⎟×⎜
after seeing evidence ⎝ before seeing evidence ⎠ ⎝ Prob(Evidence | Guilty) ⎠
144444244444
3

Bayes Factor

b.) Statistical Version of Bayes Theorem
Odds of No Effect ⎛ Odds of No Effect ⎞ ⎛ Prob(Data | No effect) ⎞
=⎜
⎟
⎟×⎜
after seeing data
Prob(Data | Some effect) ⎠
⎝ before seeing data ⎠ ⎝14444
4244444
3

Bayes Factor
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Figure 3: Graphical Representation of the Calculation of the
Attributable Risk (ARe) in Exposed Persons
If the risk is more than doubled in the exposed group then
ARe>50% of the total risk.

Incidence

ARe

Unexposed

Exposed
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Figure 4: Illustration of Different Patterns of Causation with the
Identical Patterns of Epidemiologic Data
In Scenario 1, 100 percent of exposed subjects with disease lose
a decade of life. In Scenario 2, 20% of exposed subjects with
disease lose 50 years of life.21

SCENARIO 1
Exposed subjects

AGE OF DISEASE OCCURRENCE
40
50
60
70 80 90
1

Identical subjects, not exposed

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
90

SCENARIO 2

40

50

60

70

80

Exposed subjects

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Identical subjects, not exposed

21

1

Adapted from Robins, supra note 16, at 542.
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